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Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all
actions of fund managers. We estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund
returns using the return gap—the difference between the reported fund return and
the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. We
document that unobserved actions of some funds persistently create value, while such
actions of other funds destroy value. Our main result shows that the return gap
predicts fund performance. (JEL G11, G23)
Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not
observe all actions of fund managers. For example, fund investors do not
observethe exacttimingoftradesandthe correspondingtransactioncosts.
On the one hand, fund investors may beneﬁt from unobserved interim
trades by skilled fund managers who use their informational advantage
to time the purchases and the sales of individual stocks optimally. On the
other hand, they may bear hidden costs, such as trading costs, agency
costs, and negative investor externalities. In this paper, we analyze the
impact of unobserved actions on mutual fund performance.
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doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl041 Advance Access publication October 25, 2006We measure the impact of unobserved actions by comparing the actual
mutualfundperformancewiththeperformanceofahypotheticalportfolio
that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. We term this return
difference the return gap. The impact of unobserved actions is included in
the investor return but not in the return of the hypothetical portfolio. For
example, commissions paid by mutual funds to their brokers or stale-price
arbitrage losses do not directly affect the returns of the holdings, but they
do adversely affect the returns to investors. On the other hand, the value-
creating interim trades increase the disclosed fund return relative to the
return of a hypothetical portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed
holdings. As a result, the return gap is negatively related to the hidden
costs and positivelyrelated to the hidden beneﬁtsof a mutualfund. Conse-
quently,thereturngapisadirectmeasureofthevalueadded(orsubtracted)
by the fund manager relative to the previously disclosed holdings.
Analyzing monthly return data on more than 2500 unique U.S. equity
funds over the period 1984–2003, we show that the average return gap is
close to zero. In particular, the equally weighted return gap for all mutual
funds in our sample equals 1.1 basis points per month, while the value-
weighted return gap equals −1.0 basis points per month. These results
indicate that the magnitude of unobserved actions is relatively small in the
aggregate. Thus, fund managers’ trades in the aggregate create sufﬁcient
value to offset trading costs and other hidden costs of fund management.
At the same time, we documenta substantial cross-sectionalvariation in
the return gap, indicating that hidden costs are more important for some
funds, while hidden beneﬁts are more pronounced for others. We also ﬁnd
strong persistence in the return gap for up to 5 years into the future, which
suggests that the return gap is driven by systematic factors. Moreover, we
ﬁnd persistence in the return gap not only for the worst performers but
also for the best performers.
Ourmainresultshows thatthe pastreturngaphelpsto predictfundper-
formance. Funds with high past return gaps tend to perform consistently
better before and after adjusting for differences in their risks and styles.
Speciﬁcally, the decile portfolio of funds with the highest lagged return
gap yields an average excess return of 1.2% per year relative to the market
return, whereas the decile portfolio of funds with the lowest return gap
generatesanaverageexcessreturnof−2.2%peryear.Thereturndifference
between the two portfolios is statistically and economically signiﬁcant.1
1 An extensive literature examines the performance of mutual funds based on either investor returns
or holdings returns. Some papers on fund performance include Jensen (1968), Grinblatt and Titman
(1989, 1993), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Ferson and Schadt
(1996), Carhart (1997), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Chen, Jagadeesh, and Wermers
(2000), Wermers (2000), Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001), P´ astor and Stambaugh (2002), Mamaysky,
Spiegel, and Zhang (2004, 2007), Cohen, Coval, and P´ astor (2005), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005),
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Kosowski, Timmermann, White, and Wermers (2006), and Cremers and
Petajisto (2006).
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To mitigate the potential impact of measurement error on the returns
to our trading strategy, we apply a ﬁltering technique, proposed by
Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005). In our sample this method leads to
a substantial increase in the performance difference between the top and
bottom deciles and allows us to identify mutual funds that signiﬁcantly
outperform passive benchmarks, even after taking into account fund
expenses. We further conﬁrm the relation between a fund’s return gap
and its subsequent performance using pooled regressions with clustered
standard errors, controlling for other fund characteristics and time-ﬁxed
effects.
We also examine the determinants of the return gap. We ﬁnd that
estimated trading costs are negatively related to the return gap. Also,
most funds in our sample exhibit relatively large correlations between
the hypothetical holdings returns and the investor returns, indicating that
their actual investment strategies do not differ signiﬁcantly from their
disclosed strategies. However, some funds have relatively low correlations
between holdings and investor returns. Our ﬁndings indicate that such
opaque funds tend to exhibit particularly poor return gaps, which suggests
that these funds may be subject to more agency problems, inducing them
to camouﬂage their actual portfolio strategies. Further, we show that the
return gap is positively related to the recent initial public offering (IPO)
holdings of a fund, consistent with the evidence in Gaspar, Massa, and
Matos (2006) and Reuter (2006). Finally, the return gap is related to other
fund attributes, such as size, age, and average new money growth (NMG).
One issue with using portfolio holdings to evaluate fund performance
is that the disclosed data reveal information about the major equity
positions at particular dates but do not indicate the exact purchase
and sale dates. As a result, the exact holding period of securities is
unknown. Furthermore, some funds may window-dress their portfolios
to hide their actual investment strategy from their investors or from
competingfunds,asshownbyMeierandSchaumburg(2004).Thus,studies
analyzing only the returns of the disclosed holdings might be subject to
signiﬁcant measurement error, as they do not capture interim trades and
various hidden costs. Our paper examines the difference between holdings
and investor returns and argues that this difference captures important
determinants of mutual fund performance that cannot be detected by
merely considering holdings returns.
Several papers compare the reported fund returns to hypothetical fund
returns on the basis of disclosed portfolio holdings. Grinblatt and Titman
(1989) use the difference between investor and holdingsreturns to estimate
the total transactions costs for mutual funds. They point out that interim
trades within a quarter and possible window-dressing activities may affect
theestimateddifference.Wermers(2000)usesinvestorandholdingsreturns
to decompose fund performance into stock-picking talent, style selection,
2381transactionscosts,andexpenses.Frank,Poterba,Shackelford,andShoven
(2004) study the performance of ‘‘copy-cat’’ funds, that is, funds that
purchase the same assets as actively managed funds as soon as these asset
holdings are disclosed. Using related differences between investor and
holdings returns, Meier and Schaumburg(2004) investigate the prevalence
of window dressing in the mutual fund industry. Bollen and Busse (2006)
study changesin mutualfund tradingcosts following two reductionsin the
tick size of U.S. equities by comparing investor and holdings returns. Our
work differs from the previous studies in that we propose the return gap as
a performance measure that captures mutual funds’ unobserved actions.
Also, we analyze the cross-sectional properties of the funds’ unobserved
actions and investigate whether the return gap measure could predict fund
performance. Finally, we document several fund characteristics that are
related to these unobserved actions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 motivates the
use of the return gap in assessing the scope of unobserved actions.
Section 2 describes the data sources and provides summary statistics.
Section 3 quantiﬁes the return gap. Section 4 examines the impact of
unobserved actions on future fund performance. Section 5 investigates
the determinants of the return gap. Section 6 discusses the economic
signiﬁcance and robustness of the performance predictability. Section 7
concludes.
1. The Return Gap
To evaluate the impact of unobserved actions, we deﬁne the return gap,
which is based on the comparison of the net investor return and the net
return of the fund’s holdings. This section describes the computation of
the return gap.
The net investor return of fund f at time t (RF) is computed as the
relative change in the net asset value of the fund shares (NAV), including
the total dividend (D) and capital gains (CG) distributions.
RF
f
t =
NAV
f
t + D
f
t + CG
f
t − NAV
f
t−1
NAV
f
t−1
. (1)
Fundmanagers subtract managementfees andother expenseson a regular
basis from the assets under management. Thus, these fees will reduce
investors’ total return, RF. On the other hand, we deﬁne the return of the
fund’s holdings (RH) as the total return of a hypothetical buy-and-hold
portfolio that invests in the most recently disclosed stock positions.
RH
f
t =
n 
i=1
˜ w
f
i,t−1Ri,t. (2)
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The weights of the individual asset classes depend on the number of shares
held by the fund at the most recent disclosure date at time t − τ(N
f
i,t−τ)
and the stock price at the end of the previous month (Pi,t−1).F u r t h e r ,w e
adjust the number of shares and the stock prices for stock splits and other
share adjustments.
˜ w
f
i,t−1 =
N
f
i,t−τPi,t−1
n 
i=1
N
f
i,t−τPi,t−1
. (3)
We deﬁne the return gap (RG) as the difference between the net investor
return and the net holdings return:
RG
f
t = RF
f
t − (RH
f
t − EXP
f
t ). (4)
Thus,thereturngapcapturesthefunds’unobservedactions,whichinclude
hiddenbeneﬁtsandhiddencosts.Animportanthiddenbeneﬁtresultsfrom
a fund’s interim trades, as discussed in Ferson and Khang (2002). Even
though we can observe fund holdings only at speciﬁc points in time, funds
may trade actively between these disclosure dates. If these interim trades
create value, then the fund return RF will increase, while the return of
the disclosed holdings RH will remain unaffected. For example, if a fund
purchases a well-performing stock, then the abnormal return will only be
reﬂected in the fund return but not in the holdings return until the stock
position is disclosed. Also, if a fund obtains an IPO allocation, then the
return gap will tend to be positive on the ﬁrst trading day if the market
price of a newly listed stock increases relative to its IPO allocation price.
Finally,hiddenbeneﬁtscanresultfromotherfundactions,suchassecurity
lending.
The other component of the unobserved actions is the fund’s hidden
costs, which include trading costs and commissions,2 agency costs,3 and
investor externalities.4 For example, funds that are subject to a higher
price impact, or funds that are exposed to higher commissions, will have
higher hidden costs.
It is impossible to fully disentangle the hidden beneﬁts and costs.
Therefore, the primary interest of this study is to gauge the overall impact
2 See, for example, Livingston and O’Neal (1996), Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (1999), Wermers (2000),
and Karceski, Livingston, and O’Neal (2005) for studies of the trading costs of mutual funds. Mahoney
(2004) describes the various costs in more detail.
3 See, for example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Carhart, Kaniel,
Musto, and Reed (2002), Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006), Meier and Schaumburg (2004), Nanda,
Wang, and Zheng (2004), and Davis and Kim (2007).
4 See, for example, Edelen (1999), Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000), Goetzmann, Ivkovic, and
Rouwenhorst (2001), Greene and Hodges (2002), Zitzewitz (2003), Johnson (2004), and Nanda, Wang,
and Zheng (2005).
2383of unobserved actions on fund performance. By analyzing the sign and
the magnitude of the return gap, we can infer the relative importance of
unobserved actions for a given fund.
2. Data and Summary Statistics
For our empirical analysis, we merge the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database with the
Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum holdings database and the CRSP
stock price data following the methodology of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and
Zheng (2005). Our sample covers the time period between 1984 and 2003.
The CRSP mutual fund database includes information on fund returns,
total net assets (TNA), different types of fees, investment objectives,
and other fund characteristics. The CDA/Spectrum database provides
stockholdings of mutual funds. The data are collected both from reports
ﬁled by mutual funds with the SEC and from voluntary reports generated
by the funds. During most of our sample period, funds are required by
law to disclose their holdings semiannually. Nevertheless, about 49% of
funds in our sample disclose their holdings quarterly.5 Another 4.6% of
observations with valid CRSP data do not have available holdings data
during the previous 6 months.6 We also link reported stockholdings to the
CRSP stock database.
To focus our analysis on open-end domestic equity mutual funds, for
which the holdings data are most complete and reliable, we eliminate
balanced, bond, money market, international, and sector funds, as well as
fundsnotinvestedprimarilyinequitysecurities.Wealsoexcludefundsthat
hold fewer than 10 stocks and those which in the previous month managed
less than $5 million. For funds with multiple share classes, we eliminate
the duplicated funds and compute the fund-level variables by aggregating
across the different share classes.7 Appendix A provides further details on
the sample selection.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the main fund attributes. Our
sampleincludes2543distinctfundsand211,001fund-monthobservations.
5 Ge and Zheng (2005) investigate both the determinants and potential effects of portfolio disclosure
frequency by comparing funds that provide quarterly voluntary disclosure with funds that provide only
semiannual disclosure.
6 We also compute hypothetical portfolio returns on the basis of the future holdings. We ﬁnd that these
forward-looking holdings returns are, on average, about 3% per year higher than the backward-looking
holdings returns, mostly because many mutual funds tend to invest in stocks that recently performed well
either because they follow momentum strategies or because they window-dress their portfolios toward
recent winners. We also ﬁnd that the forward-looking holdings return is less correlated with the reported
return than the backward-looking holdings return. This indicates that the backward-looking return is
a better proxy for the effective fund holdings than the forward-looking return. We do not analyze the
forward-looking holdings return because of these look-ahead biases.
7 For most variables, we use a value-weighted average for the fund-level observation. For fund age, we use
the oldest of all share classes.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
Standard
Mean Median deviation
Number of distinct mutual funds 2543
Number of fund-month observations 211,001
Number of funds per month 879 720
Proportion of index funds (in %) 4.53
Proportion of load funds (in %) 54.22
TNA (total net assets) (in millions) 952 166 3,771
Age 13.49 8 13.98
Expense ratio (in %) 1.24 1.20 0.44
Turnover ratio (in %) 88.06 65.00 103.51
Mean of prior-year new money growth (in % per month;
winsorized)
2.50 0.35 9.45
Mean investor return (in % per month) 0.85 1.15 5.79
Standard deviation of investor returns over prior year (in %
per month)
5.27 4.87 2.48
Proportion invested in stocks (in %) 93.16 95.22 7.72
Proportion invested in cash (in %) 5.51 3.81 6.51
Proportion Invested in bonds (in %) 0.75 0 2.55
Proportion invested in preferred stocks (in %) 0.24 0 1.91
Proportion invested in other securities (in %) 0.33 0 2.60
Difference in TNA after adjusting for nonstock holdings (in
%)
8.33 3.73 17.64
Trading costs per year (in %) 0.58 0.36 0.66
Weight of recent IPOs divided by length of disclosure period
(in %)
0.22 0.01 0.49
Correlation between holdings and investor returns (in %) 97.96 99.11 5.06
Value of trades relative to market capitalization (in %) 0.28 0.11 0.45
Size score (score ranging between 1–5 using size quintiles) 4.05 4.44 0.97
Value score (score ranging between 1–5 using
book-to-market quintiles)
2.58 2.57 0.51
Momentum score (score ranging between 1–5 using
momentum quintiles)
3.33 3.29 0.61
This table presents the summary statistics for the sample of equity mutual funds over the period 1984 to
2003.
Thenumberof fundsrangesfrom 244 (January1984) to 1816 (April 2002).
The vast majority of mutual funds in our sample (95.47%) are actively
managed.8
We report summary statistics on fund TNA, age, expenses, turnover,
returns, and NMG. We deﬁne NMG as the growth rate of the assets under
management (TNA) after adjusting for the appreciation of the mutual
fund’s assets (RFt), assuming that all the cash ﬂows are invested at the end
of the period.9
NMG
f
t =
TNA
f
t − TNA
f
t−1(1 + RFt)
TNA
f
t−1
. (5)
8 We identify index funds by their names using the CRSP mutual fund data set.
9 Until 1990, the TNA was available only at a quarterly frequency. In this case, we compute the quarterly
NMG and divide it equally across the 3 months in each quarter. We winsorize this variable at the 1% level
to diminish the impact of extreme outliers.
2385Table 1 reports that our mutual funds, on average, invest 93.16% of
their assets in stocks and considerably less in cash or cash equivalents
(5.51%). Finally, the percentage holdings of bonds (0.75%), preferred
stocks (0.24%), and other assets (0.33%) are relatively small.
The holdings database includes only common stock positions and
excludes other nonequity holdings. To adjust fund holding returns for
the returns on the various asset classes, we proxy for these assets’ returns
using published indices. For bonds we use the total return of the Lehman
Brothers Aggregate Bond Index, while for cash holdings we use the
Treasury bill rate.10 No reliable index returns are available for preferred
stocks and for other assets. Thus, we assume that the return on preferred
stocks equals the return of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index,
and the return on other assets equals the Treasury bill rate.11
Table 1 also summarizes additional variables that we use as explanatory
variables. Owing to size requirements, conﬁdentiality considerations, and
matching issues, the CDA holdings do not represent all the mutual fund
equity securities holdings. In particular, small positions and foreign stocks
might be unavailable. To investigate whether these coverage limitations
pose a substantial concern, we compute the difference between the TNAs
reported in the CRSP database (which includes the complete holdings)
and in the CDA/Spectrum database (which includes only the reported
stock holdings). The absolute difference between the two TNA values, on
average, equals 8.33% of the average TNA after adjusting for nonequity
holdings.12 Thus, the sample represents the vast majority of the equity
holdings.
To investigate the relation between the return gap and trading costs,
we follow Wermers (2000) and estimate the funds’ trading costs based
on Keim and Madhavan (1997). In Appendix B, we describe in more
detail the procedure used to estimate trading costs. We estimate average
execution costs of 5.8 basis points per month or about 0.70% per year. The
magnitude of our trading costs is consistent with the magnitude of trading
costs estimated by Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (1999), which combines
spread costs and commissioncosts for a sample of 132 funds between 1984
and 1991. In particular, for a comparable period between 1984 and 1991
10 Data on the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index are obtained from Datastream, and the risk-free
interest is obtained from French’s Web site: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french.
11 The results remain qualitatively unchanged if we calculate the implied returns on different asset classes
in each month by regressing the return of a fund on the weights invested in the ﬁve asset classes (equity,
bonds, preferred stocks, cash, and other). The coefﬁcients are estimates of the monthly imputed returns of
the different asset classes. We ﬁnd that these imputed returns are highly correlated with the returns of the
corresponding index returns.
12 The percentage deviation in the TNAs is deﬁned as PercTNA=
|TNA CRSP−TNACDA|
0.5(TNACRSP+TNACDA). We divide the
absolute difference in TNAs by the average TNA to reduce the impact of substantial outliers.
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we obtain trading costs of 0.72% as compared to 0.78% documented in
their study.
Another variable we consider is the funds’ IPO allocations. Although
we do not know which funds obtain IPO allocations directly, we observe
stocks that go public and are subsequently held by mutual funds. On each
disclosure date, we compute for each fund the weight of companies that
recently went public. The funds might have obtained these stocks through
an IPO allocation or they might have obtained them on the open market
subsequent to the IPO. On average, mutual funds acquire in each month
common stocks of recent IPOs accounting for 0.22% of their TNA. The
median proportion of IPO stockholdings is close to zero, and a relatively
small fraction of funds accounts for most of the IPO holdings.
To measure the transparency of a fund, we compute the correlation
coefﬁcient between monthly holdings returns and investor returns during
the previous year. Funds with a lower correlation coefﬁcient between
holdings and investor returns tend to follow investment strategies that
are more opaque. Investigating unobserved actions of these funds is thus
particularly insightful. We ﬁnd that the average correlation coefﬁcient
between holdings and investor returns equals 97.96 percent.
To obtain a proxy of a fund’s market impact, we compute the relative
trade size, deﬁned as the average ratio of the absolute dollar trading
amount over the market capitalization of a particular stock, weighted by
the trade size. On average, funds trade during each disclosure period just
0.28% of the shares outstanding of a company.
The last three rows of Table 1 summarize holdings-based style
characteristics for the mutual funds in our sample. We follow Kacperczyk,
Sialm, and Zheng (2005) and group fund holdings according to their
size, value, and momentum characteristics. Each stock listed in CRSP is
groupedintorespectivequintilesaccordingtoitsmarketvalue,itsbook-to-
market ratio, and its lagged 1-year return. Using the quintile information,
wecomputethe value-weightedsize,value,andmomentumscoresforeach
mutual fund in each period.13 For example, a mutual fund that invests
only in stocks in the smallest size quintile would have a size score of 1,
while a mutual fund that invests only in the largest size quintile would
have a size score of 5.
3. Quantifying the Return Gap
In this section, we quantify the aggregate return gap between 1984 and
2003 and discuss the short- and long-term persistence of the return gap.
13 We form the book-to-market and the momentum quintiles by dividing the stocks equally into the ﬁve
groups. On the other hand, we form the size quintiles by using cut-offs from the NYSE only.
2387Table 2
Performance of investor and holdings returns
Investor return Holdings return Return gap
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns
Raw return 1.014*** 1.003*** 0.011
(0.305) (0.305) (0.009)
CAPM alpha −0.064 −0.077 0.012
(0.056) (0.056) (0.010)
Fama–French alpha −0.057 −0.062 0.005
(0.044) (0.045) (0.009)
Carhart alpha −0.068 −0.071 0.002
(0.045) (0.046) (0.009)
Panel B: Value-weighted returns
Raw return 0.988*** 0.998*** −0.010
(0.294) (0.295) (0.012)
CAPM alpha −0.075** −0.067** −0.009
(0.032) (0.033) (0.012)
Fama–French alpha −0.064** −0.045 −0.019*
(0.031) (0.032) (0.011)
Carhart alpha −0.072** −0.051 −0.021*
(0.032) (0.033) (0.012)
This table summarizes the monthly investor returns, the holdings returns after
subtracting expenses, and the return gaps for the equal- and value-weighted
portfolio of all funds in our sample over the period 1984 to 2003. The returngap
has been deﬁned as the difference between the investor return and the holdings
return of the portfolio disclosed in the previous period. The holdings return
is reported after subtracting fund expenses. We report the raw returns, the
one-factor alpha of Jensen (1968), the three-factor alpha of Fama and French
(1993), andthefour-factoralpha of Carhart(1997). Thereturnsareexpressedin
percent per month and the standard errors are summarized in parentheses.The
signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, and *** and indicate whether the results
are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent signiﬁcance
levels.
3.1 Aggregate return gap
Table 2 presents the equal- and value-weighted averages of the return
gaps for our sample. We obtain the returns by ﬁrst computing the cross-
sectional means in each month and then reporting the time-series means
along with the corresponding standard errors.
The average investor return, reported in Panel A, is equal to 1.014% per
month or about 12.17% per year. On the other hand, the average return
of a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed holdings amounts to
1.003%permonthor12.03%peryear.Thus,thereturngapequals1.1basis
points per month and is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Likewise,
if we use value-weighted portfolio returns, the average return gap equals
−1.0 basis points per month and again is not statistically signiﬁcantly
different from zero, as reported in Panel B. In summary, we ﬁnd that, in
the aggregate sample, the return gap is very small, which is equivalent to
saying that hidden costs are similar in magnitude to hidden beneﬁts. This
result indicates that fund managers, on average, have investment ability
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that creates sufﬁcient value to offset trading costs and other hidden costs,
as suggested by several mutual fund studies (e.g., Berk and Green 2004).
To further examine whether the return gap is correlated with any risk
or style factors, we report in Table 2 the return gap based on abnormal
returns after adjusting for the factor loadings using the one-factor capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The Carhart model has
the following general speciﬁcation:
Ri,t − RF,t = αi + βi,M(RM,t − RF,t) + βi,SMBSMBt
+ βi,HMLHMLt + βi,MOMMOMt + ei,t, (6)
where the dependent variable is the monthly return on portfolio i in
month t minus the risk-free rate, and the independent variables are given
by the returns of the following four zero-investment factor portfolios.
The term RM,t − RF,t denotes the excess return of the market portfolio
over the risk-free rate, SMB is the return difference between small and
large capitalization stocks, HML is the return difference between high and
low book-to-market stocks, and MOM is the return difference between
stocks with high and low past returns.14 The intercept of the model, αi,
is Carhart’s measure of abnormal performance. The CAPM uses only the
market factor, and the Fama and French model uses the ﬁrst three factors.
On the basis of the results in Table 2, we conclude that the return gap is
not affected by the adjustment for common risk or style factors. Using the
four-factor Carhart (1997) model, we obtain an abnormal equal-weighted
returngapof0.2basispointspermonth,whichisnotsigniﬁcantlydifferent
from zero.15
3.2 Persistence of the return gap
Many features of the unobserved actions indicate that such actions should
be persistent. For example, if a fund’s governance is weak in one period
because of stale-price arbitrage (Zitzewitz 2003) or cross-subsidization
(Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 2006), it is likely to remain poor in the next
period. To test whether the return gap is persistent, we sort all funds
in our sample into deciles according to their lagged return gap during
the previous 12 months and compute the average return gap during the
subsequent month by weighting all funds in each decile equally. Table 3
reports the raw and the abnormal four-factor return gaps of the decile
14 The factor returns are taken from Kenneth French’s Web site: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/Data Library.
15 We do not obtain signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on the market and momentum factors. However, the size and
book-to-market betas are statistically signiﬁcantly positive, but the economic magnitude of the coefﬁcient
estimates is small. Both coefﬁcients equal just 0.014, indicating that the actual mutual funds have a slightly
higher exposure to small and value stocks than their previously disclosed holdings.
2389Table 3
Persistence of the return gap
Abnormal return gap
Raw return gap using four-factor model
1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 1 Year 3 Years 5 Years
1. Decile −0.113*** −0.122*** −0.113*** −0.088*** −0.113*** −0.100***
(lowest RG) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026)
2. Decile −0.026 −0.040*** −0.055*** −0.015 −0.041*** −0.063***
(0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.021)
3. Decile −0.019 −0.024 −0.028** −0.017 −0.024 −0.028**
(0.011) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) (0.023) (0.013)
4. Decile −0.015 −0.016 −0.022* −0.024*** −0.018 −0.018
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
5. Decile −0.008 −0.002 −0.010 −0.015 −0.012 −0.013
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
6. Decile 0.001 −0.001 −0.006 −0.013 −0.009 −0.013
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
7. Decile −0.003 −0.013 −0.005 −0.016 −0.024** −0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
8. Decile 0.018 0.029** 0.020 0.002 0.013 −0.004
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016)
9. Decile 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.050* 0.025* 0.023 0.040
(0.016) (0.019) (0.028) (0.015) (0.018) (0.030)
10. Decile 0.154*** 0.111*** 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.078*** 0.088***
(highest RG) (0.033) (0.025) (0.023) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022)
Decile 10— 0.268*** 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.204*** 0.191*** 0.188***
Decile 1 (0.043) (0.031) (0.033) (0.040) (0.028) (0.031)
Second half— 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.082*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.063***
First half (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
Spearman 0.988*** 0.964*** 1.000*** 0.839*** 0.906*** 0.924***
correlation (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
This table reports the means and the standard errors (in parentheses) of the monthly return gaps
for decile portfolios of mutual funds sorted by their average lagged return gaps during the previous
1, 3, and 5 years over the period 1984 to 2003. The return gap is deﬁned as the difference between
the reported return and the holdings return of the portfolio disclosed in the previous period. The
ﬁrst three columns summarize the raw return gaps, and the last three columns show the four-factor
abnormal return gaps following Carhart (1997). The returns are expressed in percent per month. The
table also calculates the differences in the return gaps between the top and the bottom deciles and
the top and the bottom halves, along with the Spearman rank correlations and the corresponding
p-values in parentheses. The signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, and *** and indicate whether the
results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent signiﬁcance levels.
portfoliosformedaccordingtotheaveragereturngapsduringtheprevious
1-, 3-, and 5-year intervals. The ﬁrst column shows that funds in the worst
return gap decile, based on the previous 12 months, generate an average
return gap of −11.3 basis points in the subsequent month. On the other
hand, fundsin the best return gap decilegenerate a return gap of 15.4 basis
points. The difference in the return gaps between the two extreme deciles
is economicallyand statistically signiﬁcant, as is the difference between the
top ﬁve and the bottom ﬁve deciles. Furthermore, the average return gaps
line up almost monotonically.
In the second and the third columns, we show that the persistence
pattern remains similar if we sort funds according to their average return
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gaps during the prior 36 and 60 months. The last three columns indicate
that the persistenceﬁndings remain unchanged even if we adjust the return
gaps for the four factors of Carhart (1997).16
To provide evidence on the long-term stability of the observed patterns,
we also track the return gap’s persistence over the subsequent 5 years.
Figure 1 depictsthefuturereturn gapsfor decileportfoliosformedaccord-
ing to the average return gaps during the 12 months prior to the portfolio
formation.Panel A reportsthe raw return gaps, while Panel B additionally
adjusts the gaps for common factors in stock returns using the Carhart
(1997) model. The ﬁgure demonstrates that the raw return gap is also
remarkably persistent over a longer time period. The ranking of the decile
portfolios in the year after the formation period remains identical to
that in the formation period. Consistent with the prediction in Berk and
Green (2004), we ﬁnd some evidence for reversion toward the mean for
the extreme deciles. However, both top and bottom performers remain
persistent over the longer term.17
Carhart (1997) shows that performance persistence is not signiﬁcant for
well-performing funds after accounting for momentum effects.18 We ﬁnd
that the abnormal return gap, however, remains persistent in both tails of
the return gap distribution even after controllingfor momentumand other
common factors in stock returns. We argue that by measuring the investor
returns relative to the holdings returns we ﬁlter out the impact of common
shocks to both returns and therefore are able to focus on a component of
fund returns that has a higher signal-to-noise ratio.
4. Predictability of Fund Performance
In this section, we test whether unobserved actions contain valuable
information that can predict fund performance. Given that the return gap
isapersistentphenomenon,weshouldexpectthatfundswithhigherreturn
gaps outperform funds with lower return gaps.
16 Persistent return gaps might result just because of persistent differences in the disclosure frequencies of
mutual funds. However, this potential problem does not appear to affect our persistence results. We
continue to ﬁnd signiﬁcant levels of persistence if we consider only funds that disclosed their holdings
within the last 3 months and ignore funds that did not disclose their holdings during the last 3 months.
17 The return gaps in the ﬁrst period after the portfolio formation differ between Figure 1 and Table 3
because they cover a different estimation window. While in Figure 1 we calculate the average return gap
over the whole year after the portfolio formation, in Table 3 we report the monthly return gap in the
month after the portfolio formation to avoid overlapping observations. For example, funds in the top
return gap decile based on the previous 12 months have an average return gap of 15.4 basis points during
the ﬁrst month after the portfolio formation (Table 3) and an average monthly return gap of 12.1 basis
points during the ﬁrst year after the portfolio formation (Figure 1).
18 See Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Elton, Gruber, and Blake
(1996), Carhart (1997), Bollen and Busse (2005), and Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005) for studies
on the persistence of mutual fund performance.
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Figure 1
Persistence of the return gap
This ﬁgure depicts the average monthly return gap of portfolios tracked over a 5-year period between 1984
and2003.Thereturngapisdeﬁnedasthedifferencebetweenthenetinvestorreturnandtheholdings return
of the portfolio disclosed in the previous period and is expressed in percent per month. The portfolios are
formed by sorting all the funds into deciles according to their initial return gap during the previous year.
Subsequently, each portfolio is tracked over the next 5-year period. In Panel A, we report the raw return
gap, and in Panel B we report the return gap adjusted for the four-factor Carhart (1997) model.
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4.1 Trading strategies based on the return gap
Our ﬁrst predictability test examines the performance of a trading strategy
based on the past return gap. Speciﬁcally, we sort all funds in our
sample into deciles according to their average monthly return gap during
the previous 12 months. We then compute for each month the average
subsequent return by weighting all the funds in a decile equally.
Since the holdings of the funds are not immediately publicly available,
we introduce a 3-month lag in the return gap before implementing the
trading strategy. This implies that the return of the decile-10 portfolio
in January 2003 is based on the 10% of funds that had the highest
return gaps between October 2001 and September 2002. This allows
for at least a 4-month window for the holdings information to become
public. Including this additional implementation lag does not affect the
proﬁtability of the trading strategy substantially since the return gap is
relatively persistent.
In Table 4, we report the risk- and style-adjusted fund returns for each
decile portfolio. Funds in decile 1 have an average return gap of −59.8
basis points per month during the formation period, whereas funds in
decile 10 have an average return gap of 65.7 basis points per month during
the formation period.
Theﬁrstsixperformancemeasuresarebasedontheinvestorreturns,and
the last two measures are based on the holdings returns. The ﬁrst column
reports excess returns of the deciles relative to the market portfolio. The
next ﬁve columns report the intercepts from a time-series regression based
on the one-factor CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama and French
(1993), the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), the conditional four-
factor model of Ferson and Schadt (1996),19 and the ﬁve-factor model
of P´ astor and Stambaugh (2003).20 The two holdings-based performance
measuresaretheselectivitymeasure(CS)ofDaniel,Grinblatt,Titman,and
Wermers (DGTW) (1997) and the benchmark-free performance measure
(GT) of Grinblatt and Titman (1993).21
19 For the Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional model, we regress the return of a portfolio of mutual funds
on the four factors of Carhart (1997) and interaction terms between the four factors and ﬁve demeaned
lagged macroeconomic variables (the 1-monthTreasurybill yield, thedividend yield of the S&P 500 Index,
the Treasury yield spread [long- minus short-term bonds], the quality spread in the corporate bond market
[low- minus high-grade bonds], and an indicator variable for the month of January).
20 P´ astor and Stambaugh (2003) show that expected stock returns are related cross-sectionally to the
sensitivities of returns to ﬂuctuations in aggregate liquidity. We introduce a liquidity factor to capture
such an effect, in addition to the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. The liquidity
factor is obtained through WRDS.
21 We obtain the benchmark returnsfor the DGTWperformancemeasuresfrom RussWermers’sWeb site at
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm. The procedure for benchmark
assignment is described on page 7 of Wermers (2004), and is a slight modiﬁcation to the original
assignments in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).
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Weobservethatfundswiththeleastfavorablepastreturngaps(decile 1)
tend to signiﬁcantly underperform funds with the most favorable past
return gaps (decile 10). Investing in decile-10 funds would have generated
an additional excess return of 28.4 basis points per month or about
3.41% per year compared to investing in decile-1 funds. The relation
between past return gap and future performance is highly monotonic,
which is conﬁrmed by the Spearman rank correlation. Our results are
not inﬂuenced substantially by the variation in risk or style factors, as
reported in the next three columns. Also, controlling for macroeconomic
information following Ferson and Schadt (1996) does not adversely affect
our ﬁndings.22 Panel A of Figure 2 presents a graphical illustration of the
results discussed above.
The results, though still statistically signiﬁcant, become a little weaker if
we consider the remaining two holdings-based measures. This is plausible
since these measures reﬂect fund managers’ stock-picking abilities but do
not directly reﬂect the unobserved actions of mutual funds. Nevertheless,
the results still exhibit a positive relation between the holdings-based
performance measures and the return gap, thus indicating that fund
managers that have superior return gaps also tend to have skills based on
their disclosed trades.
All the performance measures for the top-decile funds are positive, but
many are not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the trades of these funds
create value that compensates investors at least for the expenses and the
funds’ trading costs.
To analyze the time-series performance of this trading strategy, we
compute the average annual returns of each decile in each year. In
unreported results, we ﬁnd that the top ﬁve return gap decile funds
outperform the bottom ﬁve return gap decile funds in 18 of 20 years (all
years except 1992 and 2003), which indicates that the relation between the
return gap and future performance is relatively stable over time. Further,
thespreadintheadjustedperformancewidensfurtherifweform20instead
of 10 portfolios on the basis of the lagged return gap. The difference in
excess returns relative to the market between the top and the bottom 5%
of funds amounts to 38.5 basis points, as compared to 28.4 basis points
for the corresponding difference in the decile portfolios. Similarly, the
difference in the Carhart abnormal returns between extreme portfolios
increases from 22.5 to 34.4 basis points per month.
We also examine whether our results are driven by the short-term
predictability in fund returns as described by Bollen and Busse (2005).
In unreported tests, we form portfolios on the basis of lagged annual
22 Toinvestigatewhetherstalepricesaffectourrisk-andstyle-adjustment,wealsocomputeabnormalreturns
byadding 1-monthlagged factorsbesides thecontemporaneous factors.Theloadings onthelaggedfactors
are generally not statistically signiﬁcant and the alpha estimates are not affected substantially by including
lagged factors.
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Figure 2
Returns of trading strategies
This ﬁgure shows the average monthly abnormal returns following the formation period over the period
between 1984 and 2003, expressed in percent per month. The decile portfolios are formed on the basis
of the previous 1-year return gap (Panel A) and on the previous 1-year return gap using the back-testing
technique of Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005) (Panel B), in which decile 1 has the lowest return gap
and decile 10 has the highest return gap. We use four measures of abnormal returns—the return in excess
of the market return; the market-adjusted abnormal return (CAPM); the three-factor adjusted return as
in Fama and French (1993); and the four-factor-adjusted return as in Carhart (1997).
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return gaps using different horizons. We ﬁnd that the bottom decile funds
signiﬁcantly underperform the top-decile funds using return gaps lagged
up to 36 months. For example, the difference in the four-factor alphas
between the top and the bottom deciles decreases from 22.5 basis points
per month in the base case using a 3-month lag to 15.5 basis points per
month using a 36-month implementation lag. Thus, although the return
gap is deﬁned to capture short-term fund actions, it performs well in
predicting the performance over the longer term.
Since investors cannot short mutual funds, it is not feasible to generate
returns given by the difference between the top and the bottom deciles.
However, by conditioning on the return gap investors can avoid potential
losses that are proportional to the return differences between the deciles.
4.2 Trading strategies with back-testing
In a recent study, Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005) provide evidence
that previous performance studies are plagued by estimation problems. In
particular, since many sorting variables are measured with noise, the top
and the bottom deciles of a given trading strategy might not be populated
by just the best and the worst funds, but also by funds that have the
highest estimation errors. To alleviate this problem, they suggest using a
back-testing technique in which the statistical model is required to exhibit
some past predictive success for a particular fund before it is used to make
predictions in the current period. They show that a strategy that uses
modest ex ante ﬁlters to eliminate funds whose parameters likely derive
primarily from estimation errors produces very signiﬁcant out-of-sample
risk-adjusted returns.
Motivated by their study, we eliminate funds for which the return gap
has a different sign from the excess fund return in two non-overlapping
time periods. In a ﬁrst step, we sort all funds into deciles according to
their average return gaps between 15 and 4 months prior to the portfolio
formation month. This sorting yields exactly the same portfolios as those
described in Table 4. In addition, we require that the average reported
excess returns relative to the market during the 3 months immediately
prior to the portfolio formation have the same sign as the lagged return
gaps. Thus, in the trading strategy we consider only funds for which there
is a concordance between the lagged return gap and the lagged excess
return.
Our results, summarized in Table 5, show that the performance
difference between the top and the bottom return gap decile portfolios
widens dramatically for all performance measures. For example, the
difference in the abnormal four-factor return increases from 22.5 basis
points per month to 53.5 basis points per month. We also observe that
the differences in the two holdings-based performance measures become
larger and statistically more signiﬁcant.
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After ﬁltering out funds with diverging lagged performance measures,
we ﬁnd that the funds in the top return gap decile perform particularly
well.Theabnormalreturnsofthetop-decilerangebetween1.12%(Ferson-
Schadt) and 4.64% (Fama-French) per year. All abnormal returns are now
signiﬁcantly positive, except for the Ferson-Schadt measure. Panel B of
Figure 2 presents a graphical illustration of the results.
4.3 Fund return decomposition
To understand the relative importance of the return gap in predicting
performance we decompose the fund return into its three components: the
return gap, the expense ratio, and the holdings return:
RF
f
t = RG
f
t − EXP
f
t + RH
f
t . (7)
Table 6presentsevidenceonpredictabilitybasedonthethreecomponents.
Speciﬁcally, we sort funds into deciles according to the lagged 1-year
return gap, the lagged expense ratio, and the lagged 1-year holdings
return, respectively, and then calculate the Carhart alphas for the resulting
deciles with a 3-month implementation lag. The expense deciles are sorted
in descending order, that is, highest expense funds are in decile 1 and
lowest expense funds are in decile 10. We report results with and without
back-testing. The results based on sorting on the return gap are identical
to those reported in Tables 4 and 5. In addition, we ﬁnd that funds with
high expense ratios tend to perform worse than funds with low expense
ratios. The performance difference between the lowest and the highest
expense deciles (as well as the bottom and the top 50% of the sample)
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The performance spread between
decile 10 and decile 1 sorting based on the expense ratio equals 0.135
basis points per month without back-testing and 0.337 basis points per
month with back-testing. However, these numbers are substantially lower
than those that use the return gap as the performance predictor. Thus,
the results indicate that the return gap has more power in predicting fund
performance than does the expense ratio.
Similarly,thelasttwocolumnsofTable 6conditiononthepastholdings
return to predict abnormal fund performance. Without back-testing,
higherlaggedholdingsreturnsdonotpredictsuperiorfour-factor-adjusted
returns.23 Withback-testing,theperformancespreadbetweenthehighand
low deciles is positive but remains statistically insigniﬁcant.
23 This zero abnormal performance is due to the momentum adjustment of Carhart (1997). For example, the
difference in the average abnormal returns (and the corresponding standard errors) between the top and
the bottom deciles of funds sorted according to the prior-year excess holdings returns equals 0.237 (0.255)
using the CAPM adjustment and 0.488 (0.232) using the Fama-French adjustment.
2399Table 6
Trading strategies using different portfolio formation methods
Return gap (ascending) Expenses (descending) Holdings return (ascending)
Without With Without With Without With
back-testing back-testing back-testing back-testing back-testing back-testing
1. Decile −0.199*** −0.328*** −0.098* −0.262*** −0.049 −0.216*
(0.062) (0.099) (0.052) (0.097) (0.123) (0.125)
2. Decile −0.123** −0.209** −0.125** −0.270*** −0.021 −0.096
(0.054) (0.089) (0.055) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097)
3. Decile −0.061 −0.098 −0.092 −0.274** −0.058 −0.105
(0.049) (0.086) (0.062) (0.111) (0.077) (0.097)
4. Decile −0.066 −0.127* −0.093 −0.220** −0.047 −0.085
(0.048) (0.076) (0.058) (0.097) (0.057) (0.072)
5. Decile −0.059 0.011 −0.079 −0.189* −0.047 −0.061
(0.050) (0.071) (0.058) (0.100) (0.049) (0.069)
6. Decile −0.012 0.107 −0.051 0.049 −0.046 0.003
(0.049) (0.077) (0.051) (0.083) (0.045) (0.063)
7. Decile −0.069 −0.020 −0.014 0.083 −0.089* −0.083
(0.057) (0.082) (0.053) (0.085) (0.046) (0.062)
8. Decile −0.083 0.008 −0.060 −0.016 −0.092* −0.029
(0.052) (0.081) (0.046) (0.075) (0.052) (0.065)
9. Decile −0.019 0.076 −0.029 −0.005 −0.127* −0.056
(0.056) (0.087) (0.036) (0.072) (0.069) (0.082)
10. Decile 0.025 0.208* 0.038 0.074 −0.067 0.036
(0.071) (0.107) (0.036) (0.069) (0.103) (0.116)
Decile 10— 0.225*** 0.535*** 0.135*** 0.337** −0.018 0.248
Decile 1 (0.054) (0.156) (0.047) (0.147) (0.188) (0.186)
Second half— 0.070*** 0.234* 0.074*** 0.280* −0.040 0.088
First half (0.024) (0.125) (0.022) (0.153) (0.094) (0.108)
Spearman 0.649** 0.855*** 0.915*** 0.818*** −0.656** 0.879***
correlation (0.042) (0.002) (0.318) (0.004) (0.039) (0.001)
This table reports the abnormal monthly returns using the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), along with
their standard errors (in parentheses), for deciles of mutual funds formed according to different sorting
criteria over the period 1984 to 2003. Funds are sorted on the basis of the lagged return gap, the lagged
expense ratio, and the lagged holdings return. For each measure we report, in addition, the performance
using the back-testing technique suggested by Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005), by considering only
funds where the performance measures of the various criteria are consistent with the excess reported
fund return during the 3 months prior to the portfolio formation. The returns are expressed in percent
per month. The signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, and *** and indicate whether the results are
statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent signiﬁcance levels.
5. The Determinants of the Return Gap
This section analyzes the different determinants of the return gap using
a pooled Prais-Winsten regression of the return gap on the various fund
characteristics.24 Each regression additionally includes time-ﬁxed effects.
We estimate the regressions with clustered standard errors by time to
account for a possible contemporaneous correlation structure.25
24 The results are almost identical using ordinary least squares without correcting for ﬁrst-order auto-
correlation.
25 Clustering by time generally has higher standard errors than clustering by fund or by fund family. A
comparison of the different methods can be found in Petersen (2005).
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Table 7
Determinants of the return gap
Dependent variables (in % per month)
Raw Abnormal four-factor
return gap return gap
Trading costs per month −0.754*** −0.826*** −0.792** −0.865**
(0.243) (0.269) (0.311) (0.359)
Weight of recent IPOs 0.232*** 0.243*** 0.203*** 0.227***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.037)
Correlation between holdings and 0.706** 0.692** 1.085*** 1.109***
investor returns (0.314) (0.333) (0.361) (0.391)
Expenses per month −0.339* −0.276 −0.237 −0.216
(0.180) (0.187) (0.238) (0.226)
Turnover 0.009 0.007 −0.018 −0.024
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.020)
Log of TNA −0.012*** −0.024*** −0.014*** −0.025***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Log of family TNA 0.013 *** 0.010**
(0.003) (0.004)
Log of age −0.015*** −0.010 0.009 0.015
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
New money growth 0.433*** 0.422 ** 0.674*** 0.650**
(0.148) (0.165) (0.251) (0.289)
New money growth squared −0.353* −0.350 −0.451 −0.423
(0.197) (0.217) (0.345) (0.380)
Standard deviation 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.004
of investor returns (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Load fund indicator variable −0.005 −0.018** 0.006 −0.000
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Index fund indicator variable −0.041** −0.047*** −0.058*** −0.064***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022)
Size score −0.032*** −0.038*** −0.040*** −0.042***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Value score −0.014 −0.013 −0.001 0.014
(0.020) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021)
Momentum score −0.067 ** −0.076** −0.114*** −0.125***
(0.030) (0.036) (0.035) (0.043)
Time-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 167,983 145,328 117,130 97,788
R-squared (in %) 1.64 1.56 1.69 1.62
This table reports the coefﬁcients of the Prais-Winsten panel regressions of the monthly return gaps on
various fund and fund family characteristics. The sample includes equity mutual funds and spans the
period 1984–2003. The return gap is deﬁned as the difference between the investor fund return and the
return based on the previous holdings. All regressions include time-ﬁxed effects and are performed at a
monthly frequency. The standard errors (in parentheses) take into account clustering by time. The returns
are expressed in percent per month. The signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, and *** and indicate
whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent signiﬁcance levels.
Table 7 summarizes the regression results for four different speciﬁca-
tions. The ﬁrst two columns use the raw return gap as the dependent
variable, whereas the last two columns use the abnormal four-factor-
adjusted return gap as the dependent variable. As in the previous section,
we use 3 years of past monthly return gaps to estimate the coefﬁcients of
the four-factor model. Subsequently, we subtract the expected return gap
from the realized return gap to determine the abnormal return gap of a
2401fund in each month. Since the estimation of the factor loadings requires at
least 3 years of data we lose the ﬁrst 3 years’ data.
The ﬁrst variable we consider is the trading costs, which are estimated
following Wermers (2000) and further described in Appendix B. We posit
that funds with higher trading costs should perform worse, unless the
interim trading beneﬁts offset their trading costs. We document a negative
relation between estimated trading costs and the return gap both before
and after adjusting for common risk factors. The coefﬁcient estimates on
the trading costs are statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero, but they
are not signiﬁcantly different from −1. A coefﬁcient of −1 implies that
an increase in the trading costs of 10 basis points also reduces the return
gap by 10 basis points. Thus, as expected, trading costs have an important
impact on the return gap.
IPO allocations are another important potential determinant of the
return gap. Owing to their incentive to maximize family-level proﬁts, fund
families may allocate IPOs strategically to subsidize certain funds in the
family (Nanda, Wang, and Zheng 2004; Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang
2004; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 2006; and Reuter 2006). As a result, we
expect funds that obtain more IPO allocations to exhibit a more favorable
return gap since the IPO allocations tend to be signiﬁcantly underpriced.
We ﬁnd a strong relation between IPO allocations and the return gap,
indicating that funds that own stocks immediately after they go public
have particularly favorable return gaps during this time interval. This
result is consistent with the hypothesis that these funds obtain beneﬁcial
IPO allocations, which then generate signiﬁcant ﬁrst-day trading proﬁts.
The coefﬁcient estimate on the IPO variable implies that a 1% increase in
the holdings of IPO stocks increases the return gap by 23.2 basis points
per month, which is generally consistent with the average underpricing
during this time period.26 The IPO variable remains signiﬁcant, even after
adjusting the return gap for common factors in fund returns using the
Carhart (1997) model.
The third variable we consider measures the transparency of a fund’s
investment strategy and is deﬁned as the correlation coefﬁcient between
monthly holdings and investor returns during the previous year. Funds
withalowcorrelationbetweenholdingsandinvestorreturnstendtofollow
investment strategies that are more opaque. The low correlation can result
from high turnover or from window dressing. If the low correlation is
due to agency problems, then we should observe that the low-correlation
funds perform worse. On the other hand, if the low correlationis driven by
managers opting to hide their valuable investment ideas, then we should
ﬁnd that the low-correlation funds perform better. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
26 For example, Ritter and Welch (2002) show that the average ﬁrst-day return of IPOs between 1980 and
2001 amounts to 18.8%.
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positive relation between the correlation and the return gap. This result
suggests that the fund’s opaqueness might proxy for agency problems.
In our subsequent analysis, we examine the relation between the return
gap and other fund characteristics that the existing literature has shown
to affect fund returns. We observe that funds do not compensate investors
for their higher expenses by either having lower hidden costs or higher
hidden beneﬁts. In fact, we ﬁnd a negative relation between expenses and
the return gap, although the relation is usually not statistically signiﬁcant.
An alternative way to assess the impact of trading activities is to look
at the relation between turnover and the return gap. We do not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant relation between turnover and the return gap.
Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) document that performance
decreases with fund size but increases with fund family size. Consistent
with their ﬁndings,we ﬁnd that smaller fundsand larger fund families tend
toexhibitmorefavorablereturngaps.27 Furthermore,weﬁndthatafund’s
age is negatively related to its return gap. However, the effect of age on
the return gap is often insigniﬁcant. Consistent with the ‘‘smart-money’’
effect in Gruber(1996) and Zheng(1999), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantand positive
relation between the mean lagged money ﬂow and the return gap. On the
other hand, we ﬁnd a weakly negative relation between squared NMG and
the return gap, which might result from liquidity costs.
The regression results indicate that funds which focus on large and
momentum stocks tend to exhibit lower return gaps before and after
controlling for the four Carhart (1997) factors. We also ﬁnd that the level
of the return gap is similar for load and no-load funds after adjusting for
the risk and style factors. Finally, index funds tend to have lower return
gaps than actively managed funds. As index funds have only very limited
opportunitiestocreatevaluethroughinterimtrades,thereturngapreﬂects
primarily the hidden costs of fund management.28
In unreported tests, we also investigate whether funds that rotate their
portfolios between different industries and styles exhibit superior return
gaps. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between the return gap and the
industry or the style rotation.
6. Robustness Tests
This section summarizes a number of robustness tests, which further
strengthen our conclusion that the return gap predicts fund performance.
27 In their theoretical models, Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther (2000) and Berk and Green (2004) study the
impact of diseconomies of scale in fund management.
28 This result is driven primarily by small index funds. The Vanguard 500 Index Fund, which has been the
largest index fund, has an average positive return gap of 0.66 basis points per month, whereas other index
funds have an average return gap of −1.93 basis points per month. The surprisingly large heterogeneity in
the performance of index funds has been described by Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004) and Hortacsu and
Syverson (2004).
24036.1 Return gap, expense ratios, and transactions costs
Previous studies suggest that expense ratios and transactions costs pre-
dict fund performance (e.g., Carhart 1997; Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec
1999). We examine whether differences in fund expense ratios and trading
costs are primarily responsible for the performance predictability of the
return gap.
In Table 8 we report the Carhart alphas for the return gap deciles
after adjusting for expenses and estimated trading costs. Rather than
observing a monotonic relation between the return gap and expense
ratios, we observe a U-shaped pattern for fund expense ratios across
deciles: the extreme deciles (funds with low and high return gaps) exhibit
higher expenses than the middle deciles. Furthermore, if expenses are
driving the performance results, we should observe no clear pattern
in before-expense alphas. However, the before-expense alphas show a
pattern very similar to that of the after-expense alphas: funds with
low return gaps signiﬁcantly underperform funds with high return gaps.
The performance difference between the lowest and the highest return
gap deciles (as well as the bottom 50% and the top 50%) is almost
identical for the after-expense and the before-expense alphas. Thus, fund
expenses are not driving the performance predictability of the return
gap.
Similarly, to shed light on the importance of trading costs, Table 8
reports the estimated trading costs and the Carhart alphas before
estimated transactions costs for the deciles sorted according to the
lagged 1-year return gap. Again, we observe a U-shaped pattern for
the estimated trading costs across the deciles. When we add back the
estimated trading costs and study the fund performance before deducting
all fund costs, we ﬁnd a similar performance pattern for the deciles:
funds with low return gaps signiﬁcantly underperform funds with high
return gaps even before deducting transactions costs and expenses.
Thus, the estimated transactions costs cannot explain the performance
predictability of the return gap. However, the actual fund trading costs
might still be related to the return gap since the estimated trading
costs do not take into account heterogeneous trading efﬁciency across
funds.
Adding back expenses and estimated trading costs indicates that mutual
fund managers in the top return gap decile follow investment strategies
that persistently create value. For example, the before-cost abnormal
return of funds in decile 10 equals 21.6 basis points per month or about
2.6% per year, which demonstrates substantial investment ability. On
the other hand, the before-cost abnormal return of funds in decile 1
is insigniﬁcantly different from zero, which indicates that these funds
tend to underperform primarily because of their expenses and trading
costs.
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Table 8
Portfolio returns after adjusting for expenses and trading costs
Carhart alpha
Carhart alpha Carhart alpha Trading before expenses
after expenses Expenses before expenses costs and trading costs
1. Decile −0.199*** 0.109 −0.091 0.066 −0.010
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
2. Decile −0.123** 0.099 −0.024 0.047 0.027
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
3. Decile −0.061 0.093 0.033 0.039 0.078
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
4. Decile −0.066 0.088 0.022 0.033 0.061
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
5. Decile −0.059 0.086 0.027 0.031 0.064
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
6. Decile −0.012 0.086 0.074 0.031 0.109**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
7. Decile −0.069 0.089 0.020 0.036 0.063
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
8. Decile −0.083 0.094 0.011 0.042 0.056
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
9. Decile −0.019 0.100 0.081 0.053 0.135**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
10. Decile 0.025 0.112 0.137* 0.076 0.216***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.072)
Decile 10— 0.225*** 0.003*** 0.227*** 0.010*** 0.226***
Decile 1 (0.054) (0.001) (0.054) (0.001) (0.053)
Second half— 0.070*** 0.001*** 0.071*** 0.005*** 0.072***
First half (0.024) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.024)
Spearman 0.649** 0.170 0.661** 0.171 0.697**
correlation (0.042) (0.638) (0.038) (0.637) (0.025)
This table reports the means and the standard errors (in parentheses) of monthly abnormal returns,
expenses, and estimated trading costs for deciles of mutual funds sorted according to the lagged 1-year
return gap over the period 1984 to 2003. The return gap is lagged for one additional quarter to account
for the possible delay in reporting the holdings. The return gap is deﬁned as the difference between the
investor fund return and the return based on the previous holdings. We use the four-factor alpha of
Carhart (1997) to measure fund performance. The returns are expressed in percent per month. The table
also reports the differences in the return gaps between the top and the bottom deciles and the top and the
bottom halves, along with the Spearman rank correlations and the corresponding p-values in parentheses.
The signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, and *** and indicate whether the results are statistically
different from zero at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent signiﬁcance levels.
6.2 Trading strategies based on alternative selection criteria
Table 9 reports the abnormal four-factor returns of decile portfolios
of mutual funds on the basis of various portfolio formation criteria.
As a benchmark, the ﬁrst column repeats the performance differences
of portfolios formed according to the return gap over the previous
12 months. Columns two and three report the performance results by
forming portfolios on the basis of the return gaps over the previous
36 and 60 months. The results remain qualitatively unaffected using the
alternative formation windows.
Column four reports results obtained from sorting funds according to
their return gap before expenses, which is deﬁned as the raw return gap
minus the monthly expense ratio. This measure corresponds to the total
2405Table 9
Portfolio returns based on the return gap: various sorting criteria
Return gap Return gap Return gap
Return gap Return gap Return gap subtracting for no-load for nonindex
1 Year 3 Years 5 Years expenses funds funds
1. Decile −0.199*** −0.234*** −0.146** −0.221*** −0.183*** −0.203***
(lowest RG) (0.062) (0.060) (0.068) (0.062) (0.068) (0.062)
2. Decile −0.123** −0.100* −0.115* −0.135** −0.131** −0.128**
(0.054) (0.055) (0.063) (0.053) (0.059) (0.054)
3. Decile −0.061 −0.060 −0.097* −0.057 −0.072 −0.070
(0.049) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) (0.058) (0.050)
4. Decile −0.066 −0.029 −0.112** −0.074 −0.004 −0.073
(0.048) (0.043) (0.049) (0.052) (0.059) (0.049)
5. Decile −0.059 −0.090** −0.053 −0.057 −0.027 −0.056
(0.050) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) (0.063) (0.052)
6. Decile −0.012 −0.055 −0.087* −0.013 −0.000 −0.019
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
7. Decile −0.069 −0.075 −0.100 −0.085 −0.008 −0.072
(0.057) (0.057) (0.061) (0.054) (0.062) (0.058)
8. Decile −0.083 −0.067 −0.013 −0.067 −0.109* −0.086
(0.052) (0.057) (0.066) (0.051) (0.058) (0.052)
9. Decile −0.019 0.019 0.038 0.012 −0.078 −0.015
(0.056) (0.060) (0.069) (0.053) (0.057) (0.056)
10. Decile 0.025 −0.017 0.012 0.028 0.029 0.026
(highest RG) (0.071) (0.067) (0.070) (0.071) (0.079) (0.072)
Decile 10— 0.225*** 0.217*** 0.158*** 0.249*** 0.212*** 0.229***
Decile 1 (0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.057) (0.081) (0.055)
Second half— 0.070*** 0.063*** 0.074*** 0.084*** 0.050 0.072***
First half (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.024)
Spearman 0.649** 0.697** 0.879*** 0.736** 0.515 0.721**
correlation (0.042) (0.025) (0.001) (0.015) (0.128) (0.019)
This table reports the monthly abnormal returns according to the four-factor model of Carhart (1997),
along with their standard errors (in parentheses), for deciles of mutual funds formed according to different
sorting criteria over the period 1984 to 2003. The returns are expressed in percent per month. The
signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, and *** and indicate whether the results are statistically different
from zero at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent signiﬁcance levels.
gap between investor return and holdings return. Taking into account
expenses only slightly improves the performance of decile 10 relative to
decile 1.
In calculatingreturns on our strategies we do notconsiderthe loadsthat
need to be paid to purchase the funds. Perhaps high return gap funds also
have high loads, which subsequently could reduce the overall performance
of the proposed strategies. To assess the sensitivity of our results to this
possibility, we exclude load funds and form decile portfolios on the basis
of the return gap. The results remain qualitatively similar.
Finally, we exclude index funds from the analysis since index funds
should have return gaps close to zero. The results with nonindex funds are
very similar to the base case.
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6.3 Market impact
The trades of mutual funds might exert a nontrivial impact on market
prices.Iffunds’transactionsinducemarketimpact,thereturngapmeasure
may be affected. For example, suppose that a fund gradually liquidates
one of its positions and the resulting selling pressure leads to a decline in
the company’s stock price. The hypothetical holdings portfolio assumes
that the fund held the company’s stock for the whole disclosure period,
while the actual fund held the average stock for a shorter time period. In
this case, the return gap would be positive even if this transaction caused
signiﬁcant trading costs. A positive return gap would also occur if a fund
gradually purchased a given stock within a disclosure period. Thus, the
returngapwouldbeabiasedmeasureofthefund’stradingcosts.However,
the return gap is still an unbiased measure of the unobserved actions of a
mutual fund, which consist of market impact costs (which are negative)
and interim trading beneﬁts (which are positive in this example).
Such gradual trading strategies should result in higher average return
gaps for funds that generate higher market impact and might explain the
persistenceofthereturngap.Ontheotherhand,suchtradingstrategieswill
be unable to explain our main performance predictability results, because
we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of the lagged return gap on the abnormal
investor return. Actually, if such sequential trading strategies were the
main determinant of the cross-sectional variation in the return gap, then
we would probably observe a negative relation between the return gap and
investor returns, because funds with persistently high market impact levels
would experience consistently low investor returns because of their high
trading costs.
In Table 10, we investigate in more detail whether the market impact
affectsthereturngapandtheproﬁtabilityofthetradingstrategies.We ﬁrst
sort funds into quintiles according to their potential market impact. We
measurethemarketimpactbytherelativetradesize,deﬁnedastheaverage
ratio of the absolute dollar trading amount over the market capitalization
of a stock, weighted by the trade size. On average, funds in the bottom
quintile trade 0.025% of the shares outstanding of a particular company,
whereas funds in the top quintile trade 1.026% of the shares outstanding.
Thus,themarketimpactshouldaffecttopquintilefundsmoresigniﬁcantly
than bottom quintile funds.
Next, we compute the average return gaps for each quintile. We ﬁnd
thattheaveragereturn gapsarequitesimilarin magnitudeforthedifferent
market impact groups. Moreover, funds in the ﬁfth quintile exhibit the
lowestaveragereturngap,whichcontradictsthehypothesisthatthereturn
gap is driven primarily by market impact effects.
To assess the relative predictive power of the market impact measure
and the return gap, we further sort funds within each market impact
quintile into quintiles according to their lagged 1-year return gap. We
2407Table 10
Portfolio returns based on the return gap conditional on market impact
Market impact quintiles
1. Quintile 5. Quintile
(lowest (highest
market market Quintile 5−
impact) 2. Quintile 3. Quintile 4. Quintile impact) Quintile 1
Mean relative trade 0.025 0.081 0.173 0.350 1.026 1.000
size (in %)
Mean return gap −0.002 0.004 0.012 0.015 −0.011 −0.009
(in % per month) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Abnormal return −0.048 −0.097** −0.057 −0.060 −0.091 −0.044
All funds (0.030) (0.043) (0.049) (0.057) (0.068) (0.055)
1. RG quintile −0.162*** −0.169*** −0.153** −0.133* −0.135 0.027
(0.040) (0.052) (0.071) (0.072) (0.090) (0.089)
2. RG quintile 0.015 −0.118** −0.043 −0.073 −0.133* −0.148*
(0.038) (0.046) (0.054) (0.065) (0.080) (0.075)
3. RG quintile −0.041 0.015 −0.014 −0.047 −0.111 −0.070
(0.037) (0.050) (0.063) (0.073) (0.070) (0.062)
4. RG quintile −0.042 −0.132** −0.003 −0.041 −0.038 0.005
(0.046) (0.053) (0.062) (0.065) (0.079) (0.074)
5. RG quintile −0.012 −0.052 −0.004 0.048 0.003 0.016
(0.050) (0.062) (0.060) (0.083) (0.089) (0.082)
Quintile 5−Quintile 1 0.150*** 0.118** 0.148** 0.181** 0.138* −0.012
(0.055) (0.056) (0.072) (0.074) (0.084) (0.105)
Quintile 5−Quintile 1 0.153 0.247* 0.234 0.365* 0.534*** 0.381**
With back-testing (0.123) (0.140) (0.165) (0.192) (0.203) (0.163)
This table reports the monthly abnormal returns according to the four-factor model of Carhart (1997),
along with their standard errors (in parentheses), for quintiles formed according to the relative trade size
and for quintiles formedaccording tothe lagged returngap between15 and 4 months prior tothe portfolio
formation over the period 1984 to 2003. The relative trade size is deﬁned for each mutual fund as the
weighted average of the ratio between the absolute value of a trade and the market capitalization of the
corresponding stock. The average is weighted by the absolute value of all the trade transactions of a fund.
The last row reports the abnormal return difference between the top and the bottom return gap quintiles
using the back-testing technique suggested by Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005), by considering only
funds in which the performance measures of the various criteria are consistent with the excess reported
fund return during the 3 months prior to the portfolio formation. The returns are expressed in percent
per month. The signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, and *** and indicate whether the results are
statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent signiﬁcance levels.
ﬁnd that for each market impact quintile, funds with low return gaps
signiﬁcantly underperform funds with high return gaps. The magnitude of
the performance difference between the lowest and the highest return gap
quintiles is consistent across the different market impact groups.
We also compute the performance of quintile portfolios using the back-
testing technique suggested by Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2005) and
report the difference between the two extreme return gap quintiles in the
lastrow.Back-testingtendstoincreasetheperformancedifferencebetween
the extreme return gap quintiles.
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Table 11
Portfolio returns based on the return gap conditional on unidentiﬁed holdings
Quintiles according to the relative difference in TNAs
1. Quintile 5. Quintile
(lowest (highest Quintile 5−
difference) 2. Quintile 3. Quintile 4. Quintile difference) Quintile 1
Mean difference in TNAs 0.70 2.35 4.56 8.28 26.68 25.98
(in %)
Mean return gap 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.012 −0.027 −0.039*
(in % per month) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.020)
Abnormal return −0.062 −0.085* −0.101* −0.069 −0.050 0.013
All funds (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.049) (0.050) (0.059)
1. RG quintile −0.111 −0.174** −0.289*** −0.135** −0.138* −0.028
(0.074) (0.069) (0.067) (0.068) (0.071) (0.088)
2. RG quintile −0.059 −0.030 −0.120** −0.094 −0.016 0.043
(0.059) (0.059) (0.056) (0.060) (0.067) (0.078)
3. RG quintile 0.006 −0.041 −0.018 −0.012 −0.081 −0.087
(0.058) (0.060) (0.061) (0.056) (0.060) (0.064)
4. RG quintile −0.019 −0.108* −0.035 −0.081 −0.029 −0.009
(0.064) (0.058) (0.066) (0.062) (0.058) (0.071)
5. RG quintile −0.071 −0.015 −0.019 0.026 0.010 0.081
(0.072) (0.066) (0.074) (0.066) (0.089) (0.091)
Quintile 5−Quintile 1 0.039 0.159** 0.270*** 0.160** 0.148** 0.109
(0.066) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.080) (0.096)
Quintile 5−Quintile 1 0.362** 0.342** 0.577*** 0.455*** 0.383** 0.025
With back-testing (0.165) (0.163) (0.159) (0.175) (0.171) (0.128)
This table reports the monthly abnormal returns according to the four-factor model of Carhart (1997),
along with their standard errors (in parentheses), for quintiles formed according to the percentage
absolute deviation between the disclosed equity holdings and the TNA and for quintiles formed
according to the lagged return gap between 15 and 4 months prior to the portfolio formation over the
period 1984 to 2003. The last row reports the abnormal return difference between the top and the bottom
return gap quintiles using the back-testing technique suggested by Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang
(2005), by considering only funds where the performance measures of the various criteria are consistent
with the excess reported fund return during the 3 months prior to the portfolio formation. The returns
are expressed in percent per month. The signiﬁcance levels are denoted by *, **, and *** and indicate
whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent signiﬁcance levels.
Thus, we conclude that systematic differences in market impact do not
drive the performance predictability of the return gap.
6.4 Unidentiﬁed holdings
One of the potential problems of our analysis results from the fact that
we do not identify all stockholdings from the CDA/Spectrum database.
Although on average we identify 92% of the stockholdings, this fraction
varies across funds. As a result, the unidentiﬁed holdings can have unique
characteristics that might affect the return gap and fund performance. For
example, unidentiﬁed holdings might be less liquid and might perform
differently from the reported holdings.
In Table 11, we study the effect of unidentiﬁed holdings on the
performance predictability of the return gap. We ﬁrst sort funds into
quintiles according to the percentage of their unidentiﬁed holdings after
2409adjusting for the percentage of nonstock holdings. Quintile 1 consists
of funds with the lowest percentage of unidentiﬁed holdings (0.70%),
while quintile 5 includes funds with the highest percentage of unidentiﬁed
holdings (26.68%). We observe that the monthly return gap is similar for
the four bottom quintiles and varies between 1.2 and 1.5 basis points
per month, and is lowest for the top quintile (–2.7 basis points per
month). Thus, the unidentiﬁed holdings seem to perform slightly worse
Table 12
Predictability of future returns: regression evidence
Dependent variable: abnormal Carhart four-factor returns (in % per month)
Prior-year return gap 0.151*** 0.216*** 0.213*** 0.189*** 0.178***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048) (0.051)
Prior-year expenses −1.499*** −1.672*** −1.242*** −1.034**
(0.489) (0.464) (0.352) (0.399)
Prior-year excess 0.141** 0.144** 0.153** 0.157**
holdings return (0.067) (0.068) (0.074) (0.077)
Log of lagged TNA −0.021** −0.024*** −0.034***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012)
Log of lagged family 0.011
TNA (0.007)
Log of age −0.022* −0.024* −0.013
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Prior-year turnover −0.047 0.023 0.021
(0.034) (0.026) (0.029)
Index fund indicator −0.014 −0.019 −0.012
variable (0.032) (0.034) (0.035)
Load fund indicator −0.016 −0.020 −0.034*
variable (0.015) (0.017) (0.019)
Trading costs per month −2.183*** −2.172***
(0.619) (0.701)
Weight of recent IPOs 0.238*** 0.264***
(0.067) (0.077)
Correlation between 0.210 0.180
returns (0.300) (0.316)
New money growth −0.037 0.045
(0.673) (0.762)
New money growth squared −0.431 −0.580
(0.817) (0.919)
Standard deviation of −0.012 −0.008
investor returns (0.047) (0.050)
Size score −0.081** −0.080**
(0.036) (0.039)
Value score 0.002 0.024
(0.075) (0.086)
Momentum score −0.184* −0.221*
(0.097) (0.113)
Time-ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 150,946 150,946 150,210 142,083 120,969
R-Squared (in %) 8.33 8.88 9.01 9.42 9.72
This table reports the coefﬁcients of Prais-Winsten regressions of monthly abnormal returns on various
fundattributes.Thesampleincludesallequitymutualfundsinoursampleandspanstheperiod1984–2003.
The dependent variable is the four-factor abnormal return of Carhart (1997). All regressions include time
ﬁxed effects and are performed at a monthly frequency. Cluster-corrected standard errors have been
provided in parentheses. The returns are expressed in percent per month. The signiﬁcance levels are
denoted by *, **, and *** and indicate whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-,
5-, and 1-percent signiﬁcance levels.
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than the reported holdings. Further, we sort funds within each quintile
according to their lagged 1-year return gap and examine the monthly
abnormal returns from the Carhart four-factor model. Except for quintile
1 (funds with the lowest unmatched holdings), funds with low return
gaps signiﬁcantly underperform funds with high return gaps. Using back-
testing, the performance difference between the lowest and highest return
gap quintiles increasesand is statistically signiﬁcantfor all ﬁve quintileson
the basis of unidentiﬁed holdings. Thus, the effect of unidentiﬁed holdings
on return predictability does not appear to be substantial.
6.5 Multivariate regression approach
This section uses a pooled multivariate Prais-Winsten regression approach
to conﬁrm that the return gap has predictive power for future excess
and abnormal returns, controlling for other fund-speciﬁc characteristics.
Table 12 summarizes the estimates using the four-factor Carhart (1997)
abnormalreturnasthedependentvariable.Weestimatethefactorloadings
by regressing the fund returns on the common factors during a 36-
month window prior to the relevant monthly observation. In addition, all
regressions include time-ﬁxed effects and the standard errors are corrected
for clustering by time.
The results, reported in Table 12, demonstrate that the return gap has
an important impact on future fund performance, even after controlling
for other fund characteristics and for time-ﬁxed effects. For example, a
1-standard-deviation increase in the past return gap (0.44% per month)
increases the future fund return by between 6.6 and 9.5 basis points per
month. Lagged expenses and lagged excess holdings returns also exhibit a
signiﬁcant impact on the four-factor-adjusted returns.
The signs of the remaining coefﬁcients are consistent with the existing
evidence. For example, we ﬁnd a negative relation between size and
fund performance, conﬁrming Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik’s (2004)
diseconomiesof scale argument. On the other hand, age, turnover, and the
index fund indicator variable play a secondary role.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the impact of unobserved actions on fund
performance using a large sample of US equity mutual funds between
1984 and 2003. We estimate the extent of unobserved actions by taking the
difference between the investor returns and the buy-and-hold returns of
the portfolio disclosed in the most recent past. This difference, termed the
return gap, presents us with several interesting ﬁndings. First, the effect of
unobserved actions is persistent in the long run both for the bottom and
the top performing funds. Second, funds differ substantially with respect
to the impact of such actions. Third, the cross-sectional difference in
unobservedactions has signiﬁcant predictive power for fund performance.
2411Even though estimating the impact of unobserved actions may serve as
a helpful tool to evaluate mutual funds, an alternative and simpler way to
judge any fund’s actions could be just to consider its net returns. We argue
that by benchmarking the investor returns against the holdings returns,
we ﬁlter out the impact of common shocks to both returns and are able to
obtain a more precise measure of the short-term unobserved actions.
The return gap measures a fund’s short-term performance due to
unobserved actions and captures the manager’s value added relative
to the previously disclosed holdings. It may reﬂect investment skills,
trading costs, and agency costs. We show that the return gap is important
for predicting fund performance and for identifying funds with negative
unobserved actions that adversely affect investor returns.
Appendix A: Sample Selection
We start with a sample of all mutual funds in the CRSP mutual fund database covering the
period between 1984 and 2003. The focus of our analysis is on domestic equity mutual funds,
for which the holdings data are the most complete and reliable. As a result, we eliminate
balanced, bond, money market, sector, and international funds, as well as funds not invested
primarily in equity securities. We base our selection criteria on the objective codes and on
the disclosed asset compositions. First, we select funds with the following ICDI objectives:
AG, GI, LG, or IN. If a fund does not have any of the above ICDI objectives, we select
funds with the following Strategic Insight objectives: AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, or
SCG. If a fund has neither the Strategic Insight nor the ICDI objective, then we go to the
Wiesenberger Fund Type Code and pick funds with the following objectives: G, G-I, AGG,
GCI, GRI, GRO, LTG, MCG, and SCG. If none of these objectives is available and the
fund has a CS policy (Common Stocks are the securities mainly held by the fund), then the
fund is included. We exclude funds that have the following Investment Objective Codes in
the Spectrum Database: International, Municipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred, and Balanced.
Since the reported objectives do not always indicate whether a fund portfolio is balanced or
not, we also exclude funds that, on average, hold less than 80% or more than 105% in stocks.
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) and Evans (2004) identify a form of survival bias in the
CRSP mutual fund database, which results from a strategy used by fund families to enhance
their return histories. Fund families might incubate several private funds and they will only
make public the track record of the surviving incubated funds, while the returns for those
funds that are terminated are not made public. To address this incubation bias, we exclude
the observations where the year for the observation is prior to the reported fund-starting
year and we exclude observations where the names of the funds are missing in the CRSP
database. Data may be reported prior to the year of fund organization if a fund is incubated
before it is made publicly available, and these funds might not report their names or some
other fund attributes, as shown by Evans (2004). Incubated funds also tend to be smaller,
which motivates us to exclude funds that had in the previous month less than US$5 million
in assets under management.
In the next step, we are able to match about 94% of the CRSP funds to the Spectrum
database. The unmatched funds tend to be younger and smaller than the funds for which we
ﬁnd data in Spectrum. Wermers (2000) mentions that the Spectrum data set often does not
have any holdings data available during the ﬁrst few quarters listed in the CRSP database.
Mutual fund families introduced different share classes in the 1990s. Since different share
classes have the same holdings composition, we aggregate all the observations pertaining
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to different share classes into one observation. For the qualitative attributes of funds (e.g.,
name, objectives, year of origination), we retain the observation of the oldest fund. For the
TNA under management, we sum the TNAs of the different share classes. Finally, for the
other quantitative attributes of funds (e.g., returns, expenses, loads), we take the weighted
average of the attributes of the individual share classes, where the weights are the lagged
TNAs of the individual share classes. The aggregation of multiple share classes reduces our
sample size to 3171 unique funds.
For most of our sample period, mutual funds are required to disclose their holdings
semiannually. A large number of funds disclose their holdings quarterly, while a small
number of funds have gaps between holdings disclosure dates of more than 6 months. To
ﬁll these gaps, we impute the holdings of missing quarters using the most recently available
holdings, assuming that mutual funds follow a buy-and-hold strategy. In our sample, 72% of
the observations are from the most recent quarter and less than 5% of the holdings are more
than two quarters old. We exclude funds that have fewer than 10 identiﬁed stock positions
andfundsthatdidnotdisclosetheirholdingsduring thelastyear.Thisﬁnalselection criterion
reduces the number of mutual funds used in this study to 2543 funds.
Appendix B: Trading Costs
We follow Wermers (2000) in estimating the execution costs of mutual funds. His estimates
follow Keim and Madhavan (1997), who provide ﬁtted regressions for total institutional
execution costs (commissions and market impact) for a sample of investors between 1991
and 1993. The execution costs are estimated separately for the costs of buying and selling
stocks. The costs of buying or selling particular stocks are calculated as follows:
C
Buy
i,t = 1.098 + 0.336D
Nasdaq
i,t + 0.092TradeSize i,t − 0.084Log(MktCap) + 13.807
1
Pi,t
CSell
i,t = 0.979 + 0.058D
Nasdaq
i,t + 0.214TradeSize i,t − 0.059Log(MktCap) + 6.537
1
Pi,t
.
The total costs (in percentage of the trade value) of a given purchase and sale transaction
of stock i in quarter t are denoted by C
Buy
i,t and CSell
i,t . TradeSize denotes the dollar value
of a trade divided by the market capitalization of the stock, MktCap denotes the market
capitalization of the stock (expressed in thousands), Pi,t is the stock price, and D
Nasdaq
i,t is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the stock is traded on NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Monthly
execution costs are obtained by dividing the quarterly costs equally over the 3 months.29
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